a witness shall not be heard to allege his own turpitude." Several other eighteenth-century rules of evidence rested on this same premise, but few have currency today. 8 Their demise may partially be attributed to the unsoundness of the premise itself. In contrast, the Delaval rule, though an innovation in the law, 9 became widely accepted because of Lord Mansfield's influence.' 0 The rule has long been sustained by policies favoring convenience in judicial administration and stability of verdicts."
Indeed, many courts fear that its abandonment would permit disappointed litigants to harass jurors in an effort to establish their misconduct as grounds for overturning an adverse verdict. 2 Although the Delaval rule has become well entrenched judicially, it has been abrogated by statute in several jurisdictions." 8 Moreover, however, the court would hear one who by chance or design overheard jury deliberations.
7The premises of this era enjoyed greater authority when stated in Latin, thus: "Nemo turpitudinem suam allegans audietur." SSe 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2352(C) ( 3 d ed. 1940), MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 68 n.12 (1954 the Hall case reflects judicial discomfiture with the rule. The majority was dearly hesitant to rest its decision solely on a strict application of this rule forbidding impeachment of verdicts, as is shown by its consideration of the extraneous matter. Since there was no evidence in this case other than the juror affidavits to show that the jurors had used an encydopedia, under the Delaval rule the verdict could not be set aside, even if prejudice were found. But the court suggested that the trial judge would have set aside the verdict in spite of the rule against impeaching verdicts, if any harm had been done." 4 This suggestion indicates that the court would allow a trial judge to consider the prejudicial effect of juror misconduct and then exercise his general discretionary power to set aside verdicts" 5 accordingly, regardless of the source of the information tending to prove misconduct. Although juror affidavits are not properly admissible to impeach the verdict directly, they would apparently be a suitable foundation for the exercise of the trial judge's discretionary power to set aside a verdict. The trial judge in the Hall case apparently did not know that he might circumvent the Delaval rule in this manner.
It has long been dear that trial judges should exercise their discretionary power under this statute to set aside verdicts prejudiced by juror misconduct where some evidence of (or at least good grounds for suspicion of) juror misconduct existed even in the absence of juror affidavits. The Hall decision apparently authorizes trial judges to exercise such power even if no evidence whatsoever of juror misconduct is available except from the jurors themselves (which is clearly an evasion of the Delaval rule). If the trial judge puts on record the circumstances inducing his order or refusal of a new trial, then the Supreme Court may review such order or refusal if it presents a matter of law. Moore v. Edmiston, 70 N.C. 471 (1874); 2 MCINTOSH, op. cit. supra at § 1596(7) n. 48. However, the record may not always show the circumstances on which an order setting aside the verdict (or the refusal of such an order) is based. If in such situation the record shows that the trial judge's ruling was based on his discretionary power, then there can ordinarily be no review. Bird v. Bradburn, 131 N.C.
488, 42 S.E. 936 (1902).
" The Record, p. 270, gives the trial court's consideration of the matter after the affidavits were presented to it. "Court: I realize the authenticity of the affidavits, that nobody seems to be questioning the fact that this happened and Mr. Hall used it [the encyclopedia], for whatever effect it may have, but it is a right unusual attack on a
The dissenters in the Hall decision shared the majority's distaste for use of extrinsic evidence by a jury. However, they took the straightforward position that consideration of such evidence by the jury renders the verdict impeachable, even by juror affidavits, if the appellant was prejudiced. 17 This position corresponds with the law of a few states, 18 where affidavits of jurors may be received "for the purpose of avoiding a verdict, to show any matter occurring during the trial or in the jury room, which does not essentially inhere in the verdict itself." 9 Thus, a showing of formal defects in the process of jury deliberation is permitted, but not an examination of the motives or mental processes of individual jurors.
If a jury considers extraneous evidence or engages in any other misconduct while reaching its verdict, 2 and if the court permits the verdict that's being made by the jurors themselves. It is so fundamental that they cannot attack their own verdict, can't impeach their verdict, it seems to me that we need some law supporting that a juror can come in and make the statements to that effect . . . [A] ssuming that there is a variance with the Court's instructions and, assuming that some of the jurors followed that in lieu of what the Court said, yet can you go into the jury room and prove that without running right head-on into that wall that's been put up that jurors can't impeach their own verdict. That's the stonewall." "Mr. Vann [Counsel for caveators]: Above that is the litigant's right to a fair and impartial trial."
" "This is so for the simple reason that the verdict was not rendered as the law misconduct to be established (by juror affidavits or by testimony of an eavesdropper or by any other means), then the court must decide whether to set aside the verdict. Many courts apply the rule that a new trial will be granted if "the extraneous matter could have a tendency to influence the jury in arriving at its verdict in a manner inconsistent with the legal proofs and the court's charge."'" In these jurisdictions then, the inquiry is the reasonable likelihood or even the possibility of prejudice, rather than the actual effect of the extraneous material. This is in accord with the widely accepted principle that a court will not appraise such subjective factors as beliefs, motives and reasoning processes of individual jurors, = even when it does inquire into their verdict. But when, as in this case, the jury has used unauthorized definitions, some courts hold that whether such definitions were capable of prejudicial effect on jurors is a problem "too delicate to be safely made the basis of judicial inquiry." 23 Therefore, they entertain a conclusive presumption of prejudice once misconduct of this type has been established, and set aside the verdict. In other jurisdictions the use of unauthorized definitions (or other extraneous evidence) creates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. Even today, however, jurors are expected to rely on their personal knowledge of the matters at hand when their knowledge is that which courts designate as "common knowledge." This common knowledge exception to the requirement that evidence be presented in open court seems to have greater currency in cases where a juror propounds facts in the jury room than where he propounds law (from an independent source). However, for an exceedingly strict attitude towards propounding facts, see Thomas v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 185 Kan. 6, 340 P.zd 379 (1959) ; the errant juror read a book on properties of electricity and subsequently discussed with other jurors the tendency of electricity to arc from one conductor to another when the conductors are sufficiently close to each other. The court held that this was outside the realm of common juror knowledge, and condemned the misconduct in these words: ". . . for a jury to consider independent facts, unsifted as to their accuracy by cross-examination, and unsupported by the solemnity attending their presentation on oath before a judge, jury, parties and bystanders, and without an opportunity to contradict or explain them can never be countenanced." Id. at-., 340 P.zd at 385. The North Carolina court apparently would search for prejudice without the aid of any presumption. But to the extent that the court in the Hall case grounded its decision on the Delaval rule, prejudicial effect of the extraneous evidence was not at issue. Apparently realizing the injustice of which this rule is capable, the court suggested that trial judges should exercise their discretionary power to set aside verdicts in the event of prejudicial juror misconduct, even though no suspicion of such misconduct would arise except for the juror affidavits. Circumvention of the Delaval rule in this manner may allow a court to reach a more just result; however, outright repudiation of the rule would better serve that purpose.
"'See Annot., 54. A.L.R.zd 738 (1957). In Washington Gas Light Co. v. Connolly, 214 F.2d 254, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1954), Keech, J., (dissenting) states that "the presumption of prejudice which flows from misconduct of a juror in criminal prosecutions does not apply with equal force in civil actions" and cites authorities for the presumption in criminal cases.
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